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EXPROPRIATION:
UNITED STATES CLAIMANTS' RIGHTS
AND THE FUTURE OF CUBA
ROBERT E. FREER, JR.*
I. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION
II. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETrLEMENT COMMISSION
IIl. RESTITUTION
I. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION
There are minimum standards to be met while the World
Community recognizes the sovereign right to expropriate property.
Failure to follow a semblance of the norm amounts to unlawful
confiscation, not expropriation, as illustrated by the current regime
in Cuba. The minimum standards of legal expropriation under
international law require that the taking be for a public purpose,
nondiscriminatory and compensated The traditional principles of
customary international law further require that the compensation
be prompt, adequate and effective. The 1962 General Assembly
* Senior principal, Freer & McGanny, Chartered, Washington, D.C. Member of
the Bars of Virginia and the District of Columbia. Prepared for the Cuban-
American Bar Association's Cuban Law Project, Property Rights Seminar,
November 5, 1993, Intercontinental Hotel, Miami, Florida. The author would
like to acknowledge the assistance of Moira Crouch and Albertina Fernandez,
whose research for this article was invaluable. While the author has attempted
to be objective, the views expressed are consistent with the interests of certified
claimants represented by the author who seek the return of their property.
1. U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31
(1988).
169
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources2 [hereinafter Resolution 1803] embodies the traditional
principles with respect to foreign property. It provides that in
nationalization or expropriation cases "the owner shall be paid
appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in
the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty
and in accordance with international law."3
Many undeveloped countries criticized the traditional view
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation and instead,
supported the Calvo Doctrine.4 During the 1970's, their actions
created the United Nations Resolutions implementing the New
International Economic Order [hereinafter NIEO]5 and the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States [hereinafter Charter]6 to
obstruct the international law of expropriation.
2. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, § 4, at 15, U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1962).
3. Id.
4. GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, 5 DIGEST OF INT'L LAw 635 (1943). The
Calvo Doctrine, created by an attorney from Argentina, proposes that an alien
"may seek redress for grievances only before the local [national] authorities."
No recourse is available under international law according to the Calvo Doctrine.
5. G.A. Res. 3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, sec. 4e, U.N. Doc.
No. A/9559 (1974), and G.A. Res. 3202 Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec.
Sess., Supp. No. 1, pt. VI, U.N. Doc. No. A/9559 (1974). These two United
Nations Resolutions together created the NIEO which emphasized the right of
states to control their resources "with means suitable to its own situation."
6. G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 ch. 2 art. 2(2)(c), U.N.
Doc. No. A19631 (1974). The Charter, an offspring of the NIEO Resolutions,
provides that when a nation nationalizes or expropriates foreign property,
"appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures
taking into account its relevant laws." The Charter's provision adopts the Calvo
Doctrine by not mentioning subjection to international law.
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In 1977, however, Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v.
Libya [hereinafter TOPCo], an arbitral decision, held that efforts to
obstruct the international law of expropriation were ineffective.7
The arbitrator enforced the traditional principles of customary
international law regarding expropriation! The Charter's adoption
"show[ed] unambiguously that there was no general consensus of
the States, . . . all of the industrialized countries with market
economies having abstained or having voted against it.9 Notably,
"only Resolution 1803 ... was supported by a majority of Member
States representing all of the various groups."'0  Thus, the
arbitrator concluded that Resolution 1803 still reflects current
customary international law for this issue based on the voting
behavior described above and its expression of opinion juris
communis.
Bilateral Investment Treaties [hereinafter BITs] arose to
ensure that no conflicting views existed between two nations.
Treaties create customary international law when a substantial
number of them exist to show widespread practice and opinion
juris.' By mid 1987, there was a network of 265 such BITs.1
2
7. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. Libya, 53 INT'L L. REP. 389, 17
I.L.M. 1 (1977).
8. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct.923 (1964),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956, 88 S.Ct. 1038 (1968), reh'g denied 390 U.S. 1037,
88 S.Ct. 1406 (1968). In Sabbatino, the U.S. Supreme Court chose not address
a question it interpreted as raising issues under the Act of State Doctrine. Had
the Court chosen to intervene, Sabbatino would have been entitled to
compensation. The customary international law on expropriation has further
solidified since the Sabbatino decision.
9. See note 7, supra. at 489.
10. Id. at 491.
11. U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, supra note 1, at 76.
12. Id. at 7.
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Significantly, many undeveloped countries are parties to these
treaties which aim to protect the investments originating from one
contracting party in the territory of the other contracting party. 3
According. to a study by the United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations, "most bilateral investment treaties tend
to restate traditional principles of customary international law with
respect to the treatment of foreign property abroad between the two
[p]arties."'
14
The BiTs are a "deliberate policy ... to counteract what
some capital-exporting countries considered a continuous erosion
of principles of customary international law through United Nations
resolutions," such as the NIEO and the Charter.1 5  This vast
number of BITs demonstrates that a guarantee of compensation for
expropriation is an expected prerequisite to foreign investment.
The large number also shows that nations feel bound to provide the
essential protection of compensation for expropriation. This
consensus and widespread practice demonstrated by the treaties
establishes the traditional principles requiring compensation as
current customary international law.
BITs, together with the recent rejection of the NIEO by the
United Nations General Assembly, further signify that the
traditional principles remain current international law. Due to
pressure from the International Monetary Fund to reduce debt,
undeveloped States have been inclined to concede the Calvo Clause
in order to effectuate profitable treaties with foreign investing
nations.
In 1991, Argentina, the leading proponent of the Calvo
Doctrine, signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United
States which not only omitted the Calvo Clause, but adopted the
provision: "[i]nvestments shall not be expropriated or nationalized
13. Id. at 6.




... except... upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation."" The treaty further states that foreign investors
1... shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required
by international law."' 7 "The US-Argentinean treaty enshrines the
abandonment by Argentina of the Calvo Doctrine"18 and the
adoption of the rules of customary international law.
The 1990 General Assembly Resolution 45/188 on
Entrepreneurship has essentially destroyed the United Nations New
International Economic Order (NIEO), adopted in the 1974 General
Assembly Resolutions 3201 and 3202. The concept of the NIEO
is anti-capitalistic and simply omits international law. The 1990
Resolution, however, has the objective of "establishing or
improving conditions favorable for private initiative" and
recognizes "the responsibility of the international community" in
achieving such objectives. 9 It also calls "for international support
of specific programs for private enterprise development in the least
developed countries, which should address, inter alia, the
promotion of domestic and foreign investment. '20 Furthermore,
this resolution had a vote of 138 "approvals, one abstention, and no
votes against,2' demonstrating consensus.
The 1990 Resolutiotn advocates capitalistic behavior and
encourages the involvement of international law. The NIEO
perceived the developed countries as having a duty to
16. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., 31 I.L.M. 124, 131, art. IV(1) (1992).
17. Id. at 130, art. 1I(2)(a).
18. Id. at 124 (Introductory Note).
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accommodate undeveloped countries, whereas the new resolution
places the duty on the undeveloped countries to encourage foreign
private investment. Thus, the NIEO, and thereby the Charter, have
been recalled for all practical purposes. The traditional view of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation mandated by
international law has been reaffirmed by the United Nations
General Assembly. These retractions are significant since those
States which were committed to challenging the traditional view
now do so in their treaties and in their votes at the United Nations.
Another basis for liability is the theory of unjust
enrichment, which is a general principle of international law.
General principles found in the laws of various nations establish
international law when the principles are representative of the
world community. The unjust enrichment doctrine provides that
the nationalizing state unjustifiably enriches itself when it takes
foreign property without granting compensation. The state, then,
should be liable to the foreign investor for the sum enriched.
The information on these national laws was gathered by
Dicke in his Belgrade Report where, "based on a comparison of a
representative number of states on all continents, of Capitalist and
Communists countries, of legal orders with roots in Roman Law,
Common Law as well as Islamic states, [he] proved that the
principle of unjust enrichment or an analogous construction exists
everywhere. ,
22
22. Id. at 269. There has been other discussion of Cuba's concept of Usucaplo.
This concept is found in Article 1959 of the Cuban Civil Code (November 5,
1889),and is now preserved in Articles 184 to 190. Agustfn de Goytisolo & Jos6
M. Hernndez, Debating Cuban Property Law, 1 CUBA NEWS No. 2, Oct. 1993,
P.B. The thirty year period to contest title established by the Code is recognized
by the authors of the article to be limited in effect. As they have noted, "former
owners might also take solace from rulings by the pre-Castro Supreme Court that
limited the effect of adverse possession when former owners 'could not exercise
their rights if impeded by governmental decrees or similar state action."' The
Roman Law doctrines from which this concept is drawti was never meant to
apply in situations where the state has acted outside its normal role of referee
and instead has become the "thief' undermining normal societal protection from
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Arechaga, a highly qualified publicist, also advocates the
unjust enrichment principle since it "constitutes the legal foundation
of the conduct actually followed by the United States.
2 3
Arechaga explains that "what makes the principle of unjust
enrichment highly relevant in the field of nationalizations is its
equitable foundation." 24
Finally, under the doctrine of Ex Aequo Et Bono (what is
just and good), Cuba should compensate or provide restitution for
the taken properties. Fairness requires that Cuba reimburse victims
for the confiscations. One's property should not be taken away
without compensation. "Classical international law doctrine
normally considers certain elements to be firm ingredients of fair
and equitable treatment, including non-discrimination, the
international minimum standard and the duty of protection of
foreign property by the host State."5 Cuba violates the minimum
standard by denying any compensation whatsoever. All sense of
equity is offended when a country strips people's property
unnecessarily and refuses reimbursement.
I. FOR.EIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION
Historically, the United States has dealt with the claims of
United States citizens against foreign governments in a variety of
ways. After World War II, Congress enacted the International
Claims Settlement Act, which in turn created the International
property right infringement.
23. Eduardo Jim6nez de Arechaga, Application of the Rules of State
Responsibility to the Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 222 (Kamal Hossain
ed., 1980).
24. Id. at 223.
25. U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, supra note 1, at 31.
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Claims Commission (the "ICC").2 6 In 1954, Congress abolished
the ICC and transferred all its functions and powers (and those of
the previously created War Claims Commission) to the newly
created Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (hereinafter the
"Commission" or the "FCSC").27
The Commission was established to administer and disburse
funds to United States citizens who had lost their property in
specified foreign countries. 8 In 1964, Congress added Title V,
codified as Subchapter V and also known as the "Cuban Claims
Act,"29 to the International Claims Settlement Act in order to
specifically address claims by U.S. citizens against Cuba. In its
declaration of purpose, Congress emphasized that Subchapter V did
not authorize the appropriation of any funds for claim payments,
but that it was merely establishing the procedural mechanism for
adjudicating and quantifying those claims.
There were two requirements to qualify as claimants under
the Cuban Claims Act: (1) the citizen or corporation must be
organized under the laws of the United States and (2) more than
50% of the stock in the corporation must be owned by U.S.
citizens at the time of the taking." Moreover, claims would only
be considered if American citizens held title to the property in
question not only at the time of loss, but also continuously so until
26. International Claims Act of Mar. 10, 1950, c. 54, Title I, § 2, 64 Stat. 13,
amended by Act of Aug. 9, 1955, c. 645, §§ 1, 2, 69 Stat. 562 (codified at 22
U.S.C. §1621) (1955).
27. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1954, 19 F.R. 3985 (effective July 1, 1954)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1621-1627).
28. Id.
29. 22 U.S.C. § 1643-1643k (1964). In 1966, Subchapter V was amended
to extend the applicability of its provisions to Communist China.
30. 22 U.S.C. § 1643a (1964).
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the date of filing with the FCSC.31  These requirements
effectively precluded numerous non-U.S. citizens from asserting
their claims against Cuba. 2
Subchapter V stipulated that the Commission would
complete its affairs in connection with Cuban claims no later than
July 6, 1972. By the time the FCSC submitted its Final Report of
the Cuban Claims Program to Congress, the Commission had
adjudicated a total of 8,816 claims, rejecting approximately a third
of these and certifying 5,911 as valid. The qualifying claims
submitted under the Act totaled $1.8 billion, to which an adequate
amount of interest, computed from the date of loss to the date of
settlement, should be added.33 It is interesting to note that of the
5,911 certified claims, there were only 898 personal claims and the
remaining 5,013 were corporate claims. Of the $1.8 billion
certified claims, $1.6 billion were corporate, and $1.02 billion of
that represented the top 10 claimants' claims.34
31. 22 U.S.C. § 1643c(a) (1964).
32. Paper presented by Robert C. Helander, Esq., Creditor's Rights: Claims
Against Cuban Confiscated Assets, International Conference on "Investing in
Cuba: Problems and Prospects," at 5-6, (Sept. 8, 1993).
33. Id. at 3. Estimates for the amount of claims including interest owed have
ranged from around $5 billion to almost $12 billion, based on a "fair market
rate" compounded. Jose de Cordoba, Cuba Is Selling What It Usurped
And Original Owners Are Fuming, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1993, at A14. For a
significant period during this time, an international double digit prime rate was
considered applicable. See also, Galliano, Resolution of U.S. Cuban Claims:
Toward a Democratic Free Market Post-Castro Cuba, at xi, May 20, 1993.
Galliano arrives at an $11.6 billion figure, compounded at 6%.
34. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. While the certified claims of
American citizens totaled $1.8 billion in 1960, claims by Cubans who fled Castro
and who now live in the United States have been estimated at $8 billion by a
number of experts with whom I have discussed the subject. Regrettably, neither
they nor I know of any published source for these estimates. But see id. at 3,
n. 4, (Helander noting a $7.1 billion estimate in 1958 dollars that is very close,
and citing Jos6 F. Alonso & Armando M. Lago, A First Approximation of the
1995] 177
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II. RESTITUTION
Given the generally agreed upon notion that Cuba will abandon
its centrally planned economy, it is imperative to develop certain
parameters within which the transition to a market-driven economy
may take place as smoothly as possible. It is with this end in mind
that I present these thoughts on the future of the Cuban economy.
Once the conversion from a centrally controlled economy
to a market-based one occurs (and as previously mentioned, the
overwhelming consensus seems to be that such a shift is
inevitable), Cuba will find itself in dire need of capital investment.
Generally, there are two sources of capital: foreign and domestic.
In the case of Cuba, however, the possibility of domestic
investment should be, by and large, discounted--given the ruinous
condition of the Cuban treasury and the impoverished state of its
population. In the absence of domestic-source capital, Cuba will
have to rely, at least during the initial stages of its economic
conversion, on an influx of foreign investment. This infusion of
foreign capital, however, will only take place if certain conditions
are present. For example, the Cuban government must recognize
that legitimate property rights will be respected, 35 and more
specifically, it must acknowledge that those people and entities
whose property was confiscated more than thirty years ago have a
legal right to said property. Otherwise, potential investors will
hesitate to risk capital under the threat of loss through confiscation.
None of the current scenarios seem to indicate that Cuba
plans to pay for confiscated property. Therefore, Cuba should strive
whenever possible to give full restitution of the confiscated
Foreign Assistance Requirements of a Democratic Cuba (1993) (unpublished
paper). While these claims are not "certified claims," it is hard to imagine a
political solution that does not respond to the reality of these claims as well.
35. See Section I supra, regarding the bilateral assurances being widely sought
in investment treaties.
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industrial property to the original owners.36 In other words,
restitution should be the rule, and compensation the exception. 7
Two key advantages of restitution are that investment will
generate employment and will increase productivity by placing
properties in the hands of those with both the experience and the
capital necessary to make these facilities competitive. This will in
turn result in the output of both exportable goods and essential
commodities for the Cuban population. Moreover, restitution will
encourage the formation of a Cuban tax base which will generate
tax revenues while substantially reducing compensation demands
for confiscated properties.
Notwithstanding these advantages, property owners should
be free to elect compensation for their property rather than
restitution. It should be noted, however, that compensation would
necessarily lag well behind a plan of restitution, given the cash-
poor position of the Cuban government.
Having established that restitution should be the norm in the
privatization of industrial and agricultural property in Cuba, we
must now consider the question of exactly how this process should
take place. The guiding principle of any plan of restitution and
compensation should be the need for swiftness, to ensure that the
economy does not stagnate before investment begins.38 In light
of this, Cuba should look closely at the German system of
restitution, which provides that an early deadline (such as six
months after conversion) must be set by which all claims of
36. See Robert E. Freer, Jr., The Significance of Restitution in the Economic
Recovery of Cuba, 4 U. MLMI Y.B. INT'L L. 183.
37. See Gemeinsame Erkiarung derRegierungen derBundesrepublik Deutschland
und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur Regelung offener
Vermdgensfragen (Joint Declaration of the FRG and GDR on the Settlement of
Outstanding Issues of Property Rights) (Hereinafter Joint Declaration on Property
Rights), June 15, 1990. See also Dorothy A. Jeffress, Resolving Rival Claims
on East German Property Upon German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527, 545.
38. Id. at 12.
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restitution must be made.39 In order to carry out its plan of
restitution and compensation, Cuba should immediately establish
an independent agency whose sole function would be to resolve
property claims and settle title disputes. Such an agency would
circumvent the established administrative and adjudicatory systems
which may not be able to deal with these issues in a speedy and
efficient manner. Furthermore, an independent court system
dealing exclusively with property issues could be organized,
thereby streamlining the claims process and avoiding inefficiency.
The proposed claims agency should produce a set of clear
guidelines to instruct these courts as to how to prioritize uses and
manage conflicts.4°
In determining the course of action to follow to implement
a restitution plan, Cuba might do well to study the different
programs instituted by other former communist countries and the
difficulties they have encountered. For example, Hungary adopted
a system of compensation for confiscated property without the
option of restitution. While this program served to clear title to
property quickly and efficiently, it also created a number of
problems, most significantly that of securing the resources to pay
for all the property claims. Germany, on the other hand, operates
under a system that favors restitution over compensation, and as
mentioned before, set up an early deadline to file all applications
for restitution. The need for encouraging immediate investment
clearly outweighs any potential benefit that might accrue from
additional time to file a claim.4' Further, no real conflict exists
as to the identity of the rightful owners of the large industrial
properties that would prevent a prompt restoration of their property.
None of the changes foreseen for Cuba will take place in a
39. While the German system is not free of defects, it is better suited to the
Cuban situation in terms of the need for a speedy settlement of property issues
than those adopted by other former Communist countries.




vacuum, and it is of the utmost importance to be aware of the
political and social contexts of the island. These political and
social considerations are discussed at length in "The Significance
of Restitution in the Economic Recovery of Cuba."42  The
importance of these issues, however, merits consideration here as
well.
Cuba, unlike other democratizing nations, is in a uniquely
favorable position to make a smooth progression from a centralized
to a market-oriented economy. Several factors contribute to this
situation. First, the apparent willingness and ability of the large
Cuban-American population to cooperate with and invest in a post-
Castro Cuba will provide much-needed capital as well as a
stabilizing political influence. However, it is not just the Cuban*
community in the United States which is looking forward to
investing in Cuba. Second, it is well-known that in additon to the
Cuban community, American and foreign companies also have a
keen interest in potential investment in the island. In fact, many
European and Canadian corporations have already established a
presence in Cuba through joint ventures entered into with the
Cuban government. Such endeavors are expected to increase
dramatically once the current government either reforms itself or
collapses.4
An additional consideration which will greatly contribute to
a smooth transition is the fact that a large segment of today's
Cuban population remembers life before the Castro regime, and
42. Id.
43. Those joint ventures in Cuba are at serious risk of nonrecognition and are
likely to be voided by any market economy democratic government that would
follow the present regime to the extent that they involve seized property of
others. Most recently Secretary Christopher sent a cable entitled "Buyer Beware"
to all our consulates around the world. He sought to discuss with the respective
foreign affairs ministries placing potential participants on notice regarding the
inadvisability of entering into any venture with the government of Cuba that
would pose a conflict with pre-existing property claims. Cable from Warren
Christopher, Secretary of State, to American Consulates (Sept. 9, 1993).
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will be able to adapt to a market economy with relative ease.
Consequently, the process of restitution and privatization will take
place in a speedy manner and hopefully without much opposition.
Cuba's original infrastructure from its previous market
economy still exists. In addition, the government has made some
investments in new industries, such as biotechnology, which will
facilitate the transition to a market economy.
Another important factor is Cuba's desire to reap the
benefits of its promising economic position. It must become a
stable political system and a low-risk investment for tourism and
business enterprises. Future governments and the Cuban people
will have to ensure that Cuba becomes politically secure so that it
may take full advantage of its favorable economic prospects.
44
44. The extent to which the U.S. restores access to its market for sugar grown
in Cuba will have a bearing on Cuba's economic recovery and its capacity to
fund its confiscation claim obligations. In a recent report on the Sugar Program,
the General Accounting Office presented an analysis indicating that a shift by the
U.S. and other nations that restrict access to their markets for sugar to a more
liberalized trade arrangement would result in a 50% increase in the world sugar
price level, a change that would generate significant additional revenue for Cuba.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUGAR PROGRAM: CHANGING DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS (1993) REPORT TO THE HON. CHARLES E.
SCHUMER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) (Apr. 1993). The opposition to the
sweetener provisions of NAFTA by those who benefit from the Sugar Program
suggests that restoration of market access for Cuban sugar will face strong
opposition. The sugar program responds to certain domestic economic interests
rather than to actions of the Government of Cuba. Reforms by or changes in
Cuba's Government will not moderate this opposition. Indeed, this raises
questions about the capacity of the U.S. to effectively act on behalf of American
claimants when it is required to carry out domestic programs that impair the
capacity of Cuba to fund compensation obligations. This inherent conflict of
interest, together with the elimination of any national security priority, indicate
that other claims settlements offer no precedent for the Cuban situation.
The GAO Report includes a comment by the U.S.D.A. that 10 of the 22
cane sugar refineries operating in the U.S. closed in 1982, a result the U.S.D.A.
attributes substantially to restrictions on access to sugar supplies due to the Sugar
Program. In effect, this is a governmental taking of some of the industrial
facilities that, prior to 1960, refined raw cane sugar from the properties taken by
[Vo£ 4
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In terms of social considerations, potential hostility by
Cubans in the island toward "outsiders" seems to be a key issue.
Companies interested in bringing capital and immediate
employment to Cuba should therefore spearhead investment in the
island in order to avoid possible social unrest resulting from the
restitution process. Investments will be key in maintaining an
unemployment rate at or below the 4-6% level.45  Hopefully,
improving Cuba's general economy will aid in allaying any
possible social tensions.
the Government of Cuba. The GAO Report also includes the remarkable
perception that the Sugar Program's high domestic prices stimulate significant
increases in imports of products that contain sugar as an ingredient, an effect that
may have enhanced markets in third countries for sugar grown on and processed
with properties confiscated from Americans.
45. Freer, supra note 36, citing Andrew B. Abel & Ben S. Bernanke,
MACROECONOMICS 735 (1992).
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